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Summary. We show that for international economies with two countries, in which
agents have additively separable utility functions, the existence of sunspot equilibria
is equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer paradox. This equivalence enables us
to provide some new insights on the relation of the existence of sunspot equilibria
and the multiplicity of spot market equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Awell known paradox in international trade theory is the so-called transfer paradox
(cf. Leontief, 1936). This paradox is said to occur if some country donates some of
its resources to some other country and yet the donor beneﬁts while the recipient is
worse off. The transfer paradox is important for example to understand thewidening
gap between the gross national product of less and of highly developed countries.
According to this view foreign aid may be the reason for the disadvantageous
development of the recipient country.
A well known paradox in ﬁnancial economics is the so-called sunspot paradox.
This paradox is said to occur if some exogenous event has no direct inﬂuence on the
economic fundamentals and yet the endogenous equilibrium allocation depends on
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it. Sunspot equilibria are important for example to understand the phenomenon of
self-fulﬁlling expectations which is an essential feature of ﬁnancial markets.
At ﬁrst sight these two paradoxes seemunrelated.The transfer paradox concerns
comparative statics with respect to endowment redistributions while the sunspot
paradox is a property of competitive equilibria in some given economy. The idea
that these paradoxes may be related arises from the observation that both can result
from themultiplicity of equilibria. However, multiplicity of equilibria is a sufﬁcient
but not a necessary condition for the paradoxes to occur and it would be useful to
establish actual equivalence as this would allow the two strands of literature to be
combined. The purpose of this note is to show that for a speciﬁc class of economies
these two paradoxes are indeed equivalent. Hence, this note provides a link between
two strands of the literature which have so far been developed in isolation.
The class of economies we consider are economies with two agents (resp. two
countries) whose utility functions are concave transformations of additively sepa-
rable functions. The case of two countries is the canonical international trade model
and additive separability of utility functions is a commonly used assumption in ap-
plied general equilibrium theory.Applications of the general equilibrium model are
usually done for a class of economies with a simple enough structure so that excess
demand functions remainmanageable. Computable general equilibriummodels (cf.
Shoven and Whalley, 1992), examples for the occurrence of the transfer paradox
(Leontief, 1936; Chichilniski, 1980; Chichilniski, 1983; Rao, 1992; Geanakoplos
and Heal, 1983; etc), and examples for multiple equilibria (Kehoe, 1985, 1991;
Hens et al., 1999, 2002) therefore use the class of CES-utility functions. The class
of utility functions assumed in this paper (concave transformations of additively
separable functions) includes CES-functions. For this class of economies we show
that across competitive equilibria higher levels of utility are associated with lower
marginal utility. This property is important to establish the equivalence between
the two paradoxes.
To get the intuition for our result note that a sunspot equilibrium consists of a
set of spot market equilibria (one for each sunspot state) where the endowments
of each spot market economy are obtained from redistributions resulting from the
equilibrium asset market allocation. Hence an unfavorable redistribution of endow-
ments as it occurs exogenously in the transfer paradox can be derived from asset
trade only if the agent who expects a utility loss from the transfer also sees a chance
of a utility gain in some other sunspot state. In the asset market equilibrium the
sum across states (adjusted by the common probability beliefs) of the products of
marginal utilities and wealth transfers has to be equal for both agents. The above
mentioned property then allows to order marginal utilities inversely to utility levels
and by the transfer paradox the order of wealth transfers does not coincide with the
order of utility levels. Hence by an appropriate choice of the agents’ degree of risk
aversion both agents’ ﬁrst order conditions can be satisﬁed at nontrivial levels of
asset trade which in turn implies that allocations differ across sunspot states. The
converse of this statement is also true: If there are non-trivial sunspot equilibria,
then the order crossing property just described has to hold, i.e. the transfer paradox
occurs. Of course, a rigorous argument for this intuition will be given once we have
made precise the setup of the model considered.
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As an application of the equivalence between the transfer paradox and the
sunspot paradox we show that the occurrence of sunspot equilibria is subject to
the same critique as the occurrence of the transfer paradox. In a model with two
commodities in each country, sunspot equilibria can only occur if the initial equi-
librium (the equilibrium without asset trade) is not unique. Moreover, if as in the
case of Cobb-Douglas economies, uniqueness of equilibria is guaranteed for al-
most all distributions of endowments then sunspot equilibria cannot occur at all.
Then we show, using the equivalence between the two paradoxes, that nevertheless
the occurrence of sunspot equilibria does not need to be based on the exogenous
selection among multiple equilibria. We construct a simple example in which the
equilibrium of any sunspot state is not an equilibrium of any other sunspot state.
This example is based on the idea that ﬁnancial markets may specify incomplete
insurance against the uncertainty that they induce. That is to say, in this example
asset payoffs are sunspot-dependent and incomplete.
The example further clariﬁes the relation of the existence of sunspot equilibria
and the uniqueness of spot market equilibria. This question has also been addressed
by Mas-Colell (1992) and Gottardi and Kajii (1999), for example. The result in this
section extends the results of Mas-Colell (1992) to a stronger notion of uniqueness
of spot market equilibria. As a by-product it clariﬁes a confusion that has recently
come up in Hens (2000) and Barnett and Fisher (2002). Note also that the result
of Gottardi and Kajii (1999) does not apply to our model because it relies on ﬁrst
period consumption. With ﬁrst period consumption asset trade may occur because
of intertemporal substitution and as a by-product this may introduce extrinsic un-
certainty as Cass (1989) has ﬁrst pointed out.Also for the same reason the technique
developed by Gottardi and Kajii (1999) is not applicable here because they control
the agents’utility gradients both by perturbing the utility functions and by changing
the level of ﬁrst-period consumption.
In the next section we outline the model and give the deﬁnitions of the transfer
paradox and of sunspot equilibria. Thereafter we prove our main result establishing
the equivalence of the transfer paradox and the occurrence of sunspot equilibria.
Section 4 applies this result to derive some new insights both for sunspot equilibria
and also for the transfer paradox. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We ﬁrst outline the sunspot model. The transfer paradox will then be embedded in
the sunspot model by a new interpretation of the sunspot states.
There are two periods. In the second period, one of s = 1, . . . , S, states of the
world occurs. In the ﬁrst period assets are traded. Consumption only takes place
in the second period. This assumption is important here because otherwise the
sunspot model cannot be linked to the atemporal transfer paradox model. There are
l = 1, . . . , L, commodities in each state. Since our results hold for the case of two
agents, even though it is not necessary for the general deﬁnitions, we will outright
restrict attention to two agents i = 1, 2. States are called sunspot states because the
agents’ characteristics within the states, i.e. the agents’ endowments ωi ∈ Xi and
their utility functions ui : Xi → IR, do not depend on them. Xi is a closed convex
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subset of IRL+ which denotes agent i’s consumption set. In the sunspot literature the
agents’ characteristics [(ui, ωi)i=1,2.] are called the economic fundamentals.
Throughout this note we make the
Assumption 1 (Additive separability) Both agents’ von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions ui are additively separable, i.e. ui(xi1, . . . , xiL) =
∑L
l=1 g
i
l(x
i
l)
for all xi ∈ Xi, where the functions gil , l = 1, . . . , L, are assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave. Moreover, we assume
that for every agent i at least L− 1 of the functions gil are strictly concave and that
for all commodities l there is some i for which gil is strictly concave.
Note that the assumptions on the functions gil guarantee strict quasi-concavity
of the function ui. The class of utility functions covered by this assumption is
quite large and it includes all utility functions that are commonly used in applied
general equilibrium theory. In particular, the case of CES utilities deﬁned for all
i = 1, ..., I onXi = {x ∈ IRL++|ui(x) ≥ ui(ωi)}, for someωi ∈ IRL++, is covered
by these assumptions, since then gil(xil) = (αil)1−ρ
i
(xil)
ρi for some 0 < αil < 1,
l = 1, . . . , L and some ρi < 1.
Moreover we assume that
Assumption 2 (Expected utility) For both agents, i = 1, 2, the expected utility
functions, deﬁning preferences over state contingent consumptionxi(s) ∈ IRL, s =
1, ..., S are given by
U i(xi(1), . . . , xi(S)) =
S∑
s=1
π(s)hi(ui(xi(s))) ∀xi ∈ (Xi)S ,
where the hi are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave functions.
Hence what matters for agents’ asset demand is the composition hi ◦ ui, which
are concave transformations of additively separable functions. Note that Assump-
tions 1 and 2 together are sufﬁcient to guarantee strict quasi-concavity of the func-
tion U i. In the ﬁrst period agents can trade j = 1, . . . , J , real assets with payoffs
Aj(s) ∈ IRL if state s occurs. We denote asset prices by q ∈ IRJ . Agent i’s port-
folio of assets is denoted by θi ∈ IRJ . All equilibria we consider in this setting are
special cases of competitive equilibria, which are deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is an alloca-
tion (
∗
x
i
,
∗
θ
i
),i=1,2, and a price system (
∗
p,
∗
q) such that
1. For both agents i = 1, 2:
(
∗
x
i
,
∗
θ
i
) ∈ a rgmaxxi∈Xi,θi∈IRJ
∑S
s=1 π(s)h
i(ui(xi(s)))
s.t.
∗
q · θi ≤ 0, ∗p(s) · xi(s) ≤ ∗p(s) · ωi + ∗p(s) · A(s)θi for all s = 1, . . . , S.
2. ∗x
1
(s) +
∗
x
2
(s) = ω1 + ω2 for all s = 1, . . . , S.
3.
∗
θ
1
+
∗
θ
2
= 0.
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Remark 1 To simplify the expositionwhen analyzing competitive equilibrium allo-
cations and Pareto-efﬁcient allocations we restrict attention to interior allocations,
i.e. to allocations xi in the interior of Xi, i=1,2. A sufﬁcient assumption guaran-
teeing the interiority of allocations is to impose that the functions hi and gil satisfy
the Inada condition according to which the marginal utility tends to inﬁnity at the
boundary of the consumption set Xi ⊂ IRL+.
Note that a competitive equilibrium consists of S spot market equilibria (one for
each spot market economy with endowments ωˆi(s) = ωi + A(s)θi) together with
an asset market equilibrium by which the ex-post endowments of the spot markets
are generated. Finally, note that when showing the existence of sunspot equilibria
we allow to choose the characteristics not ﬁxed by the economic fundamentals, the
sunspot extension, appropriately. The sunspot extension consist of the probabilities
of the sunspot states π, the asset structure A and also the risk aversion functions
hi. The sunspot equilibria are robust with respect to perturbations of these charac-
teristics. However sunspot equilibria will not exist for all possible choices of the
sunspot extension.
It will be convenient to introduce the spot-market economy of the economic
fundamentals as a point of reference. To abbreviate notations we therefore let this
economy be the spot market economy in the spot s = 0.
In the sunspot literature agents transfer commodity bundles across sunspot
states by trading assets. In the international trade literature one thinks of transfers
of commodities arising from donations. Each sunspot state can then be associated
with different such donations. The transfer paradox is said to occur if some agent
donates some of his resources to the other agent and yet the donor’s utility increases
while the recipients utility decreases. In this statement the utility comparison is done
across the competitive equilibria of the economy before and after the donation. In
the standard case of the transfer paradox, the transfer was considered to be a transfer
of a non-negative amount of commodities (Leontief, 1936). In order to make the
equivalence to the sunspotmodelmore obvious, we consider a slightlymore general
deﬁnition of the transfer paradox which only requires that the donated commodi-
ties have non-negative value in the competitive equilibrium after the transfer. As
Geanakoplos and Heal (1983) have already shown this generalization is innocuous.
In the following deﬁnition we consider alternative possible transfers ∆ω(z)
that we index by some scenarios z. When relating the transfer paradox to sunspot
equilibria these scenarios will be associated with different states of the world,
z = 1, ..., S. Taking care of potentially multiple equilibria the transfer paradox is
then deﬁned as in
Deﬁnition 2 (Transfer paradox) Given an economy with fundamentals
[(ui, ωi)i=1,2] the transfer paradox occurs if and only if there exists some trans-
fer of endowments (from agent 2 to agent 1), ∆ω(z), such that for the economy
[u1, u2, ω1 +∆ω(z), ω2 −∆ω(z)] there exists an equilibrium (∗x1(z), ∗x2(z), ∗p(z))
with
∗
p(z) · ∆ω(z) ≥ 0 so that u1(∗x1(z)) < u1(∗x1(0)) for some equilibrium
(
∗
x
1
(0),
∗
x
2
(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals,[(ui, ωi)i=1,2], in the reference
scenario without transfers, s = 0.
588 T. Hens and B. Pilgrim
Note that if the economic fundamentals have at least two equilibria then even
without any transfers the transfer paradox occurs. Our deﬁnition covers this case
because then ∆ω = 0 is already sufﬁcient to obtain u1(∗x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) for
the two equilibria s = 0, z. Of course if the resulting equilibria are regular then in
this case one can also ﬁnd some transfers of endowments that have positive value
and yet the recipients utility decreases. Making the transfer paradox a bit more
paradoxical.
Wewill show that the occurrence of the transfer paradox is a necessary condition
for sunspots to matter. To show a converse of this claim we consider the following
slightly stronger notion of the transfer paradox.
Deﬁnition 3 (Strong transfer paradox) Given an economy with fundamentals
[(ui, ωi)i=1,2] the strong transfer paradox occurs if and only if there exist some
transfers of endowments (from agent 2 to agent 1), ∆ω(z) and ∆ω(s˜) such that for
the economies [u1, u2, ω1 + ∆ω(s), ω2 − ∆ω(s)], s = z, s˜
1. there are some equilibria (∗x
1
(z),
∗
x
2
(z),
∗
p(z)),(
∗
x
1
(s˜),
∗
x
2
(s˜),
∗
p(s˜)) with
∗
p(z) ·
∆ω(z) ≥ 0 and ∗p(s˜) · ∆ω(s˜) ≤ 0 and
2. it holds that u1(∗x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) for some equilibrium
(
∗
x
1
(0),
∗
x
2
(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,2], in the ref-
erence scenario without transfers, s = 0.
Note, that if the economic fundamentals have at least three equilibria then by
the same reason as given for the transfer paradox the strong transfer paradox occurs.
Hence the existence of at least (three) two equilibria is sufﬁcient for the (strong)
transfer paradox. Of course, in regular economies we know that if there are at least
two equilibria then there also are at least three equilibria (cf. Dierker, 1972). This
observation indicates that in regular economies the transfer paradox and the strong
transfer paradox are actually equivalent. Indeed this is true as the next proposition
shows. Recall that in regular economies equilibria are well determined, i.e. in a
neighborhood of regular equilibria (being deﬁned by full rank of the Jacobian
of market excess demand) there exists a smooth mapping from the exogenous
parameters of the economy to the endogenous equilibrium values (cf. Debreu,
1970). In the following argument regularity needs only be required for the spot
market equilibria of the economic fundamentals. This property holds generically
in the set of agents’ initial endowments X1 × X2 (cf. Debreu, 1970).
Proposition 1 Suppose all spot market equilibria of the economic fundamentals
[(ui, ωi)i=1,2] are regular. Then the transfer paradox and the strong transfer para-
dox are equivalent.
Proof. The strong transfer paradox implies the transfer paradox. To establish the
converse suppose that the transfer paradox holds. I.e. there exists some transfer
of endowments (from agent 2 to agent 1), ∆ω(z), such that for the economy
[u1, u2, ω1 +∆ω(z), ω2 −∆ω(z)] there exists an equilibrium (∗x1(z), ∗x2(z), ∗p(z))
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with
∗
p(z) · ∆ω(z) ≥ 0 so that u1(∗x1(z)) < u1(∗x1(0)) for some equilibrium
(
∗
x
1
(0),
∗
x
2
(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals, s = 0.
We need to show that there also exists some ∆ω(s˜) such that
∗
p(s˜) ·∆ω(s˜) ≤ 0
and u1(∗x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)). This is of course the intuitive case in
which a negatively valued transfer leads to a loss in utility. However, we need to en-
sure that this is the outcome in the spotmarket equilibrium after the transfer and that
the utility loss is not too severe as compared to the loss in the transfer paradox case.
This is ensured by the regularity of the equilibrium of the economic fundamentals
from which we construct the transfer appropriately: Consider the utility gradient of
agent 1, ∇u1(∗x1(0)), at the equilibrium of the economic fundamentals. Choose the
transfers, (∆ω1(s˜)), such that ∇u1(∗x1(0))(∆ω1(s˜)) < 0. By the ﬁrst order condi-
tion of utility maximization in the reference situation s = 0 we get that this wealth
transfer evaluated at the pre-transfer prices is negative,
∗
p(0) · (∆ω(s˜)) < 0. Since
∇u1(∗x1(0))(∆ω(s˜)) < 0, by Proposition 31.2 (ii) in Magill and Quinzii (1996) we
can ﬁnd some 1 ≥ α > 0 such that u1(∗x1(0) + α(∆ω(s˜))) < u1(∗x1(0)). More-
over, by the regularity of the economy, α > 0 can be chosen small enough so that
also the utility at the induced equilibrium is smaller than in the reference situation
without transfers, u1(∗x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)). This is because in regular economies
the induced change in the equilibrium allocation ∗x
1
(s˜) can be held small so that
| u1(∗x1(s˜)) − u1(∗x1(0) + α∆ω(s˜)) | is also small. Moreover, by the same con-
tinuity argument this can be done such that ∆ω1(s˜) evaluated at prices after the
transfer is non-positive, i.e.
∗
p(s˜) · ∆ω1(s˜) ≤ 0. Finally, all this can be done with-
out decreasing the utility level too much, so that for agent 1 we get the inequality
u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)). 	unionsq
The strong transfer paradox ensures the order crossing property mentioned in
the introduction. To see this, note that it is always possible to transfer resources
from agent 2 to agent 1, say ∆ω(sˆ), such that the transfer has negative value in the
resulting equilibrium, i.e.
∗
p(sˆ) · ∆ω(sˆ) ≤ 0, and agent 1 gets a level of utility that
is smaller than any of the utility levels considered in the deﬁnition of the strong
transfer paradox, i.e. u1(∗x
1
(sˆ)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)).1 By this
observation we get three transfers, two with negative value and one with positive
value so that the utility decreases for all transfers. As we will see, byAssumption 1
on the economic fundamentals, we then get that the order of the marginal utilities
does not coincide with the order or the reverse order of the transfer values, i.e. the
order crossing property is obtained.
1 Note that these losses in utility as compared to the equilibrium of the economic fundamentals do
not conﬂict with the fact that trade is voluntary because it may be that the utility of agent 1 derived from
his initial endowments is even smaller than the expected utility obtained in the spot market equilibria.
Also the agent is assumed to be a price taker, i.e. he cannot enforce the equilibrium of the economic
fundamentals.
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3 Main result
In this section we show that under the maintained assumptions (two agents with
utility functions being concave transformations of additively separable functions)
the existence of sunspot equilibria is equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer
paradox.
To prepare for this result we ﬁrst deﬁne the agents’ indirect utility function and
their marginal utility of income within each state:
Let
vi(s) = vi(p(s), bi(s)) = max
xi∈Xi
L∑
l=1
gil(x
i
l(s)) s.t. p(s) · xi(s) ≤ bi(s)
be the indirect utility of agent i in state s. Since the functions gil , l = 1, . . . , L
are concave and since at least L − 1 of them are strictly concave there is a unique
point xi at which the utility attains its maximum, provided that for all commodities
the prices pl(s), l = 1, . . . , L and the income bi(s) are positive. In our model the
income bi(s) will be given by p(s) · (ωi +A(s) ·θi). I.e., the values of the transfers
are given by ri(s) = p(s) ·A(s) ·θi. In the analysis of the sunspot model the agents’
marginal utility of income will be important
λi(s) = ∂vhi(vi(s))∂bvi(p(s), bi(s)).
Any competitive equilibrium induces an ordering of the agents’ utilities across
states, where by Pareto-efﬁciency the order of agent 1 is inverse to the order of agent
2. The following lemma demonstrates that under Assumption 1 for both agents the
order of the marginal utilities of income are inverse to the order of their (indirect)
utilities.
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality assume that in a competitive equilibrium
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S).
Then under Assumption 1 it follows that
λ1(1) ≥ λ1(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ1(S)
and that
λ2(1) ≤ λ2(2) ≤ . . . ≤ λ2(S).
Moreover, if v1(s˜) < v1(z) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S} then the corresponding
inequality in the marginal utilities of income is also strict.
Proof. Assume that
v1(s˜) ≤ v1(z) (resp. that v1(s˜) < v1(z)) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
Then for some commodity, say k ∈ {l, . . . , L} we must have that
x1k(s˜) ≤ x1k(z) (resp. that x1k(s˜) < x1k(z)).
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Moreover, Pareto-efﬁciency within spot markets implies that for all states s =
1, . . . , S the marginal rates of substitution are equal across agents, i.e.
∂g1m(x
1
m(s))
∂g1l (x
1
l (s))
=
∂g2m(x
2
m(s))
∂g2l (x
2
l (s))
for any pair of commodities (l,m). Note that x2m(s) = ω1m + ω2m − x1m(s), s =
1, . . . , S. Hence if the functions gil are concave and if for some agent the function
gil is strictly concave then it follows that
x1l (s˜) ≤ x1l (z) (resp. that x1l (s˜) < x1l (z)) for all l = 1, . . . , L.
Without loss of generality assume that l = n is the numeraire in all states s =
1, . . . , S, where n is chosen such that g1n is strictly concave. Hence we have shown
that
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S) (with v1(s˜) < v1(z) for some s˜, z)
implies for the numeraire that
x1n(1) ≤ x1n(2) ≤ . . . ≤ x1n(S) (with x1n(s˜) < x1n(z) for some s˜, z).
From the ﬁrst order condition to the maximization problem
max
xi∈Xi
u1(x1(s)) s.t. p(s) · x1(s) ≤ b1(s)
we get that ∂bv1(p(s), b1(s)) = ∂g1n(x1n(s)) for all s = 1, . . . , S. Since h1 and
g1n are strictly concave and since x11(s) and v1(s) are increasing (resp. strictly
increasing) in s we get that
λ1(1) ≥ λ1(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ1(S) (resp. that λ1(z) > λ1(s˜)).
The claim for i = 2 follows analogously from the inverse inequalities
x2l (1) ≥ x2l (2) ≥ . . . ≥ x2l (S), for all l = 1, ..., L,
and from
v2(1) ≥ v2(2) ≥ . . . ≥ v2(S),
the latter inequalities being implied by Pareto-efﬁciency within spot markets. 	unionsq
This lemma puts us now in the position to prove the equivalence of the occur-
rence of the transfer paradox and the existence of sunspot equilibria.
Theorem 3 (Main result)Suppose both agents’utility functions are concave trans-
formations of additively separable functions (Assumption 1 and Assumption 2).
Then
1. the transfer paradox is a necessary condition for sunspots to matter and
2. the strong transfer paradox is a sufﬁcient condition for sunspots to matter.
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Proof.
1. To link the transfer paradox to the sunspot economy consider
r(s) :=
∗
p(s) · A(s)
∗
θ1,
i.e. the transfer of income from agent 2 to agent 1 as generated by asset trade in
some competitive equilibrium.
A necessary condition for optimal portfolio choice is
S∑
s=1
λi(s)π(s)r(s) = 0, i = 1, 2,
which we call the ﬁrst-order conditions for asset demand.2
Without loss of generality assume that
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S),
which by Pareto-efﬁciency within spot markets implies
v2(1) ≥ v2(2) ≥ . . . ≥ v2(S).
Now suppose, the transfer paradox does not occur. Then from the observation
made above it follows that the economic fundamentals must have a unique equi-
librium and for all states s = 1, . . . , S, r(s) ≥ 0 is equivalent to v1(s) ≥ v1(0)
and v2(s) ≤ v2(0). Accordingly r(s) ≤ 0 is equivalent to v1(s) ≤ v1(0) and
v2(s) ≥ v2(0). As above s = 0 is the index of the reference economy given by the
economic fundamentals.
Let s¯ be such that r(s) ≤ 0 for all s ≤ s¯ and r(s) ≥ 0 for all s > s¯, then the
ﬁrst-order conditions for asset demand imply that
∑
s≤s¯
(λ1(s) − λ2(s))π(s)|r(s)| =
∑
s>s¯
(λ1(s) − λ2(s))π(s)|r(s)|.
The expected utility functions U i are invariant with respect to positive afﬁne
transformations of the utility functions hi ◦ui. Hence without loss of generality we
can choose the functions hi such that for the economy in s¯ we have λi(s¯) = 1, for
i = 1, 2.
Moreover, given this normalization, from the lemma proven abovewe know that
the differences (λ1(s)−λ2(s)) are non-negative for s ≤ s¯ and they are non-positive
for s > s¯.
Hence, if sunspots didmatter, then at least one of these differences together with
the corresponding r(s) has to be non-zero, which contradicts the derived equality.
2. Suppose the strong transfer paradox occurs, then there exist transfers indexed
by s˜, z such that
r(z) ≥ 0, r(s˜) ≤ 0 and for some equilibria v1(z) < v1(s˜) < v1(0)
2 This condition follows from
∑
s λ
i(s)π(s)p(s)A(s) = γiq together with q · θi = 0, i=1,2.
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where v1(0) refers to agent 1’s utility in an equilibrium of the spot economy
s = 0.
Given the utility functions u1, u2 and given the total endowments ω1 + ω2
consider the set of Pareto-efﬁcient allocations as being parameterized by the income
transfers r.
Now we have to distinguish three cases:
Case 1: If r(z) > 0
then we know that b1(z) > 0 and therefore there exists r(sˆ) < 0 sufﬁciently
close to zero such that for the induced b1(sˆ) = (b1(z) + r(sˆ)) ≥ 0 we get v1(sˆ) <
v1(z) for some equilibrium in sˆ. By this observation and the strong transfer paradox
we have the order crossing property:
r(sˆ) ≤ 0, r(s˜) ≤ 0, r(z) > 0
while
v1(sˆ) < v1(z) < v1(s˜)
so that by Lemma 1
λ1(sˆ) > λ1(z) > λ1(s˜)
To construct the sunspot equilibrium consider an economy with the three states
s = sˆ, s˜, z. In this case the ﬁrst-order conditions for asset demand become:
λi(sˆ)π(sˆ)|r(sˆ)| + λi(s˜)π(s˜)|r(s˜)| = λi(z)π(z)|r(z)|, i = 1, 2.
Now choose π(z) < 1 sufﬁciently large (and accordingly π(sˆ) > 0 and π(s˜) >
0 sufﬁciently small) such that
π(sˆ)|r(sˆ)| + π(s˜)|r(s˜)| < π(z)|r(z)|.
Note that ∂hi is any continuous, positive and decreasing function. Recall that,
λ1(s˜) < λ1(z) and that v1(sˆ) is the smallest utility level in the three states. Hence
we can choose h1 such that λ1(sˆ) is sufﬁciently large to solve the ﬁrst order con-
dition for i = 1. Analogously it follows that λ2(sˆ) < λ2(z) and we can choose h2
such that λ2(s˜) is sufﬁciently large to solve the ﬁrst order condition for i = 2.
To complete the proof we follow the analogous steps as in Mas-Colell (1992).
Choose A ∈ IR3L×2 such that
r(s) = p(s) · (A1(s) − A2(s)) for s = s˜, sˆ, z. (1)
Finally, note that
∑
s
λ1(s)π(s)p(s) · A1(s) =
∑
s
λ1(s)π(s)p(s) · A2(s)
so that we can choose q1 = q2.Accordingly we choose θ1 = (1,−1), θ2 = (−1, 1)
so that q ·θi = 0, i = 1, 2 and θ1 +θ2 = 0. Since we have chosen an economy with
two assets, the ﬁrst-order conditions for asset trade are equivalent to the conditions∑
s λ
i(s)π(s)p(s)A(s) = γiq.
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Case 2: If r(z) = 0 and r(s˜) = 0
then by the strong transfer paradox, even without trading any asset, there is a
competitive equilibrium in which sunspots matter.
Case 3: Finally, the case r(z) = 0 and r(s˜) < 0
is already covered by the reasoning of the ﬁrst case if one changes the point of view
from agent 1 to agent 2. 	unionsq
Remark 2 Note that in the theorem above, Part 1 has been shown for the most
general statement without evoking any particular assumption on the asset structure
A ∈ IRSL×J . Part 2 however is a stronger claim the more the set of asset structures
is restricted. The choice of the asset structure matters in equation (1) of the proof.
One way of restricting A is to only consider numeraire assets so that all assets
pay off in the same commodity. Allowing for sunspot dependent assets this is a
possible choice in the solution of equation (1). If assets are not allowed to depend
on the sunspot states then one can still ﬁnd an asset structure solving equation (1),
provided the three price vectors p(s), s = s˜, sˆ, z are linearly independent. The latter
then requires to have at least 3 commodities.
Before passing to the next section we want to point out that the assumptions of
additive separability is indeed tight. The inverse association between the levels of
marginal utilities and that of utilities, as shown in Lemma 1 does not necessarily
holdwithout additive separability.As the following example showswithout additive
separability one can ﬁnd that lower utilities are associated with lower marginal util-
ities. The endowments in this example are supposed to be the ex-post endowments.
Hence they are allowed to depend on the sunspot states since the asset payoffs may
depend on them.
Remark 3 Consider a two-agent economy with two commodities. The utility func-
tions are:
u1(x1) =
√
x11x
1
2 + x
1
2 and u2(x2) =
√
x21x
2
2 + x
2
1.
Note that neither of the two utility functions is additively separable but both are
strictly monotonically increasing and strictly concave on IR2++ and both satisfy
the Inada-conditions. Moreover, note that both utility functions are homogenous
of degree one implying that both goods are normal. In situation s = 1 the ex-post
endowments are
ωˆ11(1) = 1, ωˆ
1
2(1) = 5 and ωˆ21(1) = 4, ωˆ22(1) = 2.
There is a unique equilibrium3 with prices p(1) = (1, 0.7125). The equilibrium
budgets are:
b1(1) = 4.5623 and b2(1) = 5.4249.
3 All values have been rounded to 4 decimal digits. The exact values can be found at the page
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens. Uniqueness can be seen from the graph of the excess demand also
shown on the webpage.
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The resulting allocation is:
x11(1) = 0.5380, x
1
2(1) = 5.6485 and x21(1) = 4.4620, x22(1) = 1.3515.
The utility levels are:
u1(1) = 7.3917 and u2(1) = 6.9177.
Marginal utilities within state 1,
(
∂bv
i(1) = v
i(1)
bi(1)
)
i=1,2.
, are:
∂bv
1(1) = 1.6202 and ∂bv2(1) = 1.2752.
Now consider a second situation s = 2 with the same total endowments but
with a distribution of ex-post endowments as:
ωˆ11(2) = 5, ωˆ
1
2(2) = 5 and ωˆ21(2) = 0, ωˆ22(2) = 2.
Again, there is a unique equilibrium, now with prices p(2) = (1, 1.5113). The
equilibrium budgets are:
b1(2) = 12.5563 and b2(2) = 3.0225.
The resulting allocation is:
x11(2) = 2.3164, x
1
2(2) = 6.7758 and x21(2) = 2.6836, x22(2) = 0.2242.
The utility levels are:
u1(2) = 10.7375 and u2(2) = 3.4594.
Marginal utilities within state 2 are:
∂bv
1(2) = 0.8552 and ∂bv2(2) = 1.1445.
Note that the second agent’s utility and his marginal utility has decreased in
passing from situation 1 to situation 2. Finally, note that we can ﬁnd two strictly
concave functionshi such that the same ordering still holds for themarginal utilities
λi(s) = ∂vhi(vi)∂bvi(s).
Remark 4 With more than two agents the occurrence of the transfer paradox still
requires the existence of sunspot equilibria provided marginal utilities are ordered
inversely to utility levels. Even for additively separable utilities this ordering prop-
erty may however not hold with more than two agents. Moreover, with more than
two agents the strong transfer paradox is no longer sufﬁcient for the existence of
sunspot equilibria. The simple reason is that for agent 1 the strong transfer paradox
may occur while the two other agents will not ﬁnd income transfers of opposite
sign. The case of more than two agents is analyzed in the discussion paper Hens
et al. (2004).
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4 Application
Having established the equivalence between the transfer paradox and the sunspot
paradox we now derive some new results on the existence of sunspot equilibria
and also on the possibility of the transfer paradox. Applying Trannoy (1986) we
can rule out sunspot equilibria if for all spot market economies that are induced
by the wealth transfers there is a unique equilibrium. Moreover, applying Balasko
(1978) we can rule out sunspot equilibria in the case of two commodities if the
economic fundamentals do have a unique equilibrium. Finally, using the established
equivalence we show that sunspot equilibria need not be derived from multiple
equilibria of the spot market economy that is obtained by asset trade leading to the
same endowment distribution in all states.
The issue we want to clarify by these results is the relation of the existence
of sunspot equilibria and the uniqueness of spot market equilibria. This question
has also been addressed by Mas-Colell (1992) and Gottardi and Kajii (1999), for
example. The result in this section extends the results of Mas-Colell (1992) to
a stronger notion of uniqueness of spot market equilibria. The result of Gottardi
and Kajii (1999) is not applicable to our model because it relies on ﬁrst period
consumption4.
For that purpose the following terminology is quite useful. Ever since Cass and
Shell (1983) it is now standard to say that sunspots matter if the allocation of the
competitive equilibrium depends on the sunspot states, in which case the competi-
tive equilibrium is called a sunspot equilibrium. In a sunspot equilibrium sunspots
matter because by strict concavity of the expected utility functions sunspot equilib-
ria are not ex-ante Pareto-efﬁcient. A randomization equilibrium is a competitive
equilibrium in which for some ex-post endowments the equilibrium allocation in
every state s is a spot market allocation for the same economy. If, for example, the
economic fundamentals allow for multiple equilibria then there is a randomization
equilibrium.Mas-Colell (1992) has shown thatwithmore than two comodities there
can also be randomization equilibria if there are multiple equilibria for some distri-
bution of endowments that is attainable via asset trade. In both cases the equilibrium
allocation of such a competitive equilibrium is a randomization among the set of
equilibria of some underlying economy. In randomization equilibria sunspots are a
device to coordinate agents’ expectations. This case of sunspot equilibria has found
many applications. In the international trade literature, for example, currency crises
are modelled by randomization sunspot equilibria. See, for example, the seminal
papers by Obstfeld (1994) and Obstfeld (1996) and also the interesting empirical
papers on this issue by Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne (2000).
The question that arises from these observations is whether sunspot equilibria
could be identiﬁed with randomization equilibria. This would then make them
very similar to publicly correlated equilibria known in the game theoretic literature
4 The technique used in Gottardi and Kajii (1999) is not easily applicable either because they control
the agents utility gradients both by perturbing the utility functions and by changing the level of ﬁrst-
period consumption.
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(Aumann, 1974)5. Hence, the results of this literature would then be applicable to
sunspot equilibria.
It is obvious that in our setting with sun-independent assets, i.e. when A(s) =
A(1), s = 1, . . . , S, sunspot equilibria necessarily are randomization equilibria. It
is, however, not obvious at all whether with a general asset structure there can also
be sunspot equilibria which are different from randomization equilibria. To clarify
this point some more deﬁnitions are needed.
Deﬁnition 4 (Attainable endowment distributions) Given the economic funda-
mentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,2] and given the asset structure A the endowment distribu-
tion ωˆi(s), s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, 2 is attainable if there exists some competitive
equilibrium with asset allocation (
∗
θ
i
),i=1,2, such that ωˆi(s) = ωi + A(s)
∗
θ
i
,
s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, 2.
Based on the attainability concept we now deﬁne the uniqueness concept sug-
gested in Mas-Colell (1992). This condition has later been called no potential
multiplicity by Gottardi and Kajii (1999).
Deﬁnition 5 (Strong uniqueness) The economy with the fundamentals
[(ui, ωi)i=1,2] satisﬁes the strong uniqueness property for some asset structureA, if
the spot market equilibria are unique for every attainable endowment distribution.
Remark 5 In the model of this note markets are intrinsically complete, i.e. Pareto-
efﬁcient allocations can be attained even without asset trade. With intrinsically
incomplete markets sunspots are known to matter even if the economic fundamen-
tals satisfy the strong uniqueness property [cf. Cass (1989) and the literature that
has emerged from it, Guesnerie and Laffont (1988) and Gottardi and Kajii (1999)].
In our setting with intrinsically complete markets we can derive the following
results:
Corollary 1 Under the maintained assumptions, sunspots do not matter if the
strong uniqueness property holds for all distributions of endowments in the
Edgeworth-Box.
Proof. Suppose sunspots do matter, then from our main result we know that the
transfer paradox needs to occur. However, as Trannoy (1986) has shown, this re-
quires to be able to trade to some distribution of endowments in the Edgeworth-Box
for which there are multiple equilibria, which is a violation of the strong uniqueness
property. 	unionsq
Corollary 2 Under the maintained assumptions, in the case of two commodities
sunspots do not matter if the economic fundamentals have a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose sunspots did matter then from our main result we know that the
transfer paradox needs to occur. However, as for example Balasko (1978)6 has
5 See Forges and Peck (1995) for relating sunspot equilibria to correlated equilibria in an overlapping
generations model.
6 See also the solution to exercise 15.B.10C from Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) that is
given in Hara et al. (1997).
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shown, in the case of two commodities this requires to have multiple equilibria for
the initial distributions of endowments. 	unionsq
From Corollary 2 we can see that in the case of two commodities and sun-
independent assets it is not possible to "trade from uniqueness to multiplicity". This
is because with sun-independent assets sunspots can only matter at distributions of
endowments for which there are multiple equilibria. Hens (2000) has claimed that
for an economy with two agents and two commodities in which utility functions
are concave transformations of Cobb-Douglas utility functions sunspots matter.
Corollary 2 shows that this claim is incorrect. Moreover themistake in Hens (2000)
cannot be cured by changing the values of the parameters for the same example7
because that example falls into the class of economies which are covered by this
note. Indeed for Cobb-Douglas economies the equilibrium at the initial distribution
of endowments is unique and the strong uniqueness requirement is satisﬁed for
almost all asset structures A.
Corollary 3 shows that as in the case of intrinsically incomplete markets also
with intrinsically complete markets sunspots can still matter even if they do not
serve as a coordination device among multiple equilibria.
Corollary 3 Under the maintained assumptions, even for the case of two com-
modities, there are sunspot equilibria which are not randomization equilibria.
Proof. The example we give to prove this corollary is adapted from the Example
15.B.2 inMas-Colell,Whinston andGreen (1995)8. There are two commodities and
two agents with endowments [(ω11 , ω12), (ω21 , ω22)] = [(2, r), (r, 2)]. Consumption
sets are Xi = {x ∈ IRL++|ui(x) ≥ ui(ωi)} and utility functions are given by
u1(x1) = x11 −
1
8
(x12)
−8 and u2(x2) = −1
8
(x21)
−8 + x22.
Aggregate endowments are ω = (2 + r, 2 + r) where r = 2 89 − 2 19 ≈ 0.77.
Figure 1 shows the Edgeworth Box of this economy.9
The convex curve is the set of Pareto-efﬁcient allocations that lie in the inte-
rior of the Edgeworth Box. It is given by the function x12 = 12+r−x11 . The com-
petitive equilibrium allocations of our example will be constructed out of these
interior allocations. In Figure 1 we have also drawn some budget lines indexed
by s = sˆ, z, s˜, 0, supporting four different Pareto-efﬁcient allocations which are
equilibrium allocations in the spot markets once appropriate spot market endow-
ments have been chosen. The sunspot equilibrium we construct exploits the fact
that in this example there are three equilibria for the distribution of endowments
[(ω11 , ω
1
2), (ω
2
1 , ω
2
2)] = [(2, r), (r, 2)]. Taking these endowments as the reference
7 This possibility is left open by the observation of Barnett and Fisher (2002) who demonstrate
that for the speciﬁc parameter values chosen in Hens (2000) sunspots do not matter! Moreover, in the
example they suggest instead, sunspots do not matter because agents are risk neutral.
8 See Hara et al. (1997) for the solution to the original example.
9 The Figures 1 and 2 have been generated with MATLAB. The scripts can be downloaded from
the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens.
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Figure 2. Zoom of the rectangle in Figure 1
point for the economy s = 0, we consider the transfer of endowments as visual-
ized in Figure 2. From the three equilibria at [(2, r), (r, 2)] we have chosen the one
with the highest ﬁrst agent utility to be the equilibrium allocation for the reference
situation s = 0.
The asset structure A consists of numeraire assets denominated in the second
commodity. The vertical line in Figure 2 indicates the possible direction of en-
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dowment redistributions. With reference to s = 0, in the situation z the ﬁrst agent
has received a transfer of the second commodity but his utility decreases. In the
situations sˆ, s˜ the ﬁrst agent has donated some of the second commodity and with
reference to s = 0 his utility decreases. While in sˆ it falls to the lowest of the four
values, in s˜ it obtains a value between the utility in s = 0 and s = z. Hence for
these transfers the strong transfer paradox occurs and by application of our main
result there exists a sunspot equilibrium with spot market endowments given by the
intersection of the budget lines sˆ, z,and s˜ with the vertical line through the point
(2, 0), while the selected equilibrium in reference economy has the budget line 0.
Although this sunspot equilibrium lies in a neighborhood of a randomization
equilibrium it is itself not a randomization equilibrium because all spot market
endowments differ. 	unionsq
This example exploits the multiplicity of equilibria of the economic fundamen-
tals in the sense that in the neighborhood of the endowment distribution leading
to multiple equilibria the budget lines have various slopes that are not ordered as
the utility levels resulting in the ex post spot market equilibria (see Figs. 1 and 2).
This property could however also occur with a unique equilibrium for the economic
fundamentals. Imagine for example that the area in the rectangle of Figure 1 would
lie outside the Edgeworth-Box. Then keeping the line along which the transfers are
deﬁned inside the Edgeworth-Box the same construction could be done. Unfortu-
nately, we could however give no simple utility functions as in Example 15.B.2 in
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) which would lead to this feature. Hence,
it remains a conjecture whether there exist non-randomization sunspot equilibria
even if the economic fundamentals have a unique equilibrium10.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that for international economies with two countries in which agents
have additively separable utility functions the existence of sunspot equilibria is
equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer paradox. Based on this result, we de-
rived some new conditions for the occurrence of the transfer paradox and also for
the existence of sunspot equilibria. In particular we established some new insights
on the relation of the existence of sunspot equilibria and the multiplicity of equi-
libria. While the new results are shown for frictionless two period economies with
incomplete markets, exploring the connection between sunspot equilibria and the
transfer paradox, future research might also show interesting new results in related
settings. For example one could try to get new insights for the sunspot literature
by exploring the results on the transfer paradox in the overlapping generations
model (Galor and Polemarchakis, 1987). And similarly there might be new results
in storage analyzing economies with transaction costs respectively tariffs (Lahiri
and Raimondos, 1995).
10 Note that in Mas-Colell (1992) it is not shown that for the initial distribution of endowments the
equilibrium is unique.
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